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For centuries, international law recognized that nations need not suffer an attack before they can lawfully take action to defend themselves against forces that present an imminent danger of attack. Legal scholars and international jurists often conditioned the legitimacy of preemption on the existence of an imminent threat-most often a visible mobilization of armies, navies, and air forces preparing to attack. We must adapt the concept of imminent threat to the capabilities and objectives of today's adversaries. This paper will examine both the policy espoused in the National Security Strategy in general and the specific execution of that policy in Iraq in 2003. In particular, this paper will examine whether the policy and this specific execution are preemptive or preventive in nature, and whether they successfully pass the test of Jus ad bellum or "justice of war." The framework of this treatise will be straightforward. The first portion of the paper will provide definitions of critical terms, including current and historical international sources of important concepts related to the topic. The next section will examine the current administration's published documents and public policy statements from multiple sources that define United States preemptive policy in general and specifically preemptive actions in Iraq.
The remainder of the text will consider two major questions. First, is the US policy a preventive or preemptive policy? Second, is the policy ethically sound when examined using several criteria of the just war framework? To answer these questions, we will examine a number of reputable scholars' published views on these two questions. Finally, a conclusion based on the analysis in the body of the text will complete this paper.
BACKGROUND
To effectively develop an evaluation of the United States security strategy of preemptive or preventive military action, it is first important to define a number of important terms and concepts. What truly makes this investigation so interesting is the lack of undisputed definitions for most of the critical ideas. In fact, the true issue, some would argue, lies in the definitions themselves. The key terms and concepts are: just-war moral/ethical framework, preemptive military action, preventive military action, right to self-defense, and imminent threat or danger.
JUST-WAR FRAMEWORK
A general ethical framework to evaluate national decisions about war is the "Jus ad bellum" (justice of war) criteria. Those just-war criteria are used to determine whether waging a war is justified, from a moral and ethical perspective. "The just-war tradition differs from pacifism in assuming that killing can sometimes be justified, e.g., in defense of the innocent.
But just-war criteria also assume that war can be so destructive that the burden of moral proof is on those who would wage war. " 2 Just-war criteria rise from both religious and secular backgrounds. However both sources form a fairly consistent basis for just-war criteria.
Depending on which authoritative source you choose to accept, the Jus ad bellum framework includes from four to seven criteria: just cause, legitimate authority, public declaration, right intention, proportionality, last resort, and reasonable hope of success. The most commonly accepted five do not include either public declaration or last resort as separate criteria. One can argue that these two criteria are sub-elements of other criteria -public declaration a subset of legitimate authority, and last resort a subset of proportionality. Right intention and reasonable hope of success, although important to the just-war framework, are not particularly relevant to this analysis of United States national policy. This paper will focus on only three criteria of the just-war framework: Legitimate Authority, Proportionality, and Just Cause. The greatest focus of international and national experts falls on Just Cause, because the definition of imminent threat plays so prominently in this specific criterion. The three criteria are defined below.
Legitimate Authority
Legitimate authority means that the decision to go to war was made by those authorized to do so, in accordance with national or international law. Proper authority typically resides in the sovereign power of the state and rests in specific people who can legally authorize the use of force. In some cases, this legal authority is blurred by internal differences. "In the American context, there is unresolved tension between the President as Commander in Chief and the authority of Congress to declare war." 3 In the United States, the authority to use force held by the President is different from the authority to declare war, held by Congress. This distinction can become a point of contention when considering just-war criteria. International treaties and customary law can also complicate the issue.
Proportionality
Proportionality means that in weighing the value of the war, the probable positive outcome must be greater than the expected destruction that will be caused by the war. War must also be the last resort, after all other reasonable methods have failed. 4 It would be wrong for the objectives of war to exceed that which is necessary to restore the status quo ante bellum (that which existed prior to the war) unless the additional objectives are somehow tied to ensuring future problems are thus controlled. For example, was the carving and distribution of German land to Poland, France, and others at the end of World War I in agreement with the proportionality criteria? Probably not, although the allies argued that this action would ensure that Germany would not be a threat in the future, and disputed the idea that it was done to punish Germany and her people.
Just Cause
"Possessing just cause is the first and arguably the most important condition of jus ad bellum ." 5 This criterion is perhaps at the center of the definition quandary. It is on this definition, and the definitions of subordinate concepts that many just-war debates focus. "Just cause asks for a legitimate and morally weighty reason to go to war…the baseline standard in modern war thinking is aggression. States are justified in going to war to respond to aggression received. Classically, this means borders have been crossed in force." 6 Logically, the nationstate on the receiving end of aggression, which responds to an attack, is acting in self-defense.
The great majority of just-war scholars recognize that self-defense is just cause. However, it is at this point that definitions begin to diverge and consensus breaks down.
In the framework of a preemptive war, instead of drawing on other generally recognized legitimate causes for armed intervention, such as humanitarian crises, this specific concept leads us to examine several words -aggression, self-defense, imminent, preemption, and Grotius also expands his definition of just cause in these additional passages. First, he expands the definition to include action against an aggressor who threatens danger to either person or property prior to its occurrence. Then, he defines the right to kill the aggressor a bit more clearly by using the word "immediate" to describe danger that cannot be avoided in some other manner. Finally, he reaffirms that just war includes not only the commission of injury to a people, but to anything that belongs to that people. So, according to Grotius, just war includes preemptive actions against an aggressor who commits or in some way threatens to commit, not only physical injury to the people of the state, but also against the property or, by extension, the interests of that state.
The Caroline Incident, 1837
A key concept raised by Grotius in his discourse is the idea of "immediate" danger. What does that really mean? Since Grotius's work, the more commonly used word has been "imminent" rather than "immediate." In its' simplest definition, imminent means, "about to occur;
impending." 11 Additional definitions include "threatening to occur immediately; full of danger;
threatening; menacing; perilous." 12 Finally, a usage definition comparing imminent, impending, and threatening identifies imminent as the strongest of the three and that "it denotes that something is ready to fall or happen on the instant. Impending denotes that something hangs action by air, sea, or land forces as may be necessary to maintain or restore international peace and security." 17 These two articles address collective defense against acts of aggression, and both threats to the peace and breaches of the peace. This is evidence that the United Nations does recognize that offensive military actions may be legitimate prior to an actual act of armed aggression -the right of multilateral self-defense must include threats to the peace, or something that is short of armed aggression.
There have been many examples of the United Nations authorizing action to maintain or restore international peace and security. In this context, examples of just cause could include "defense against an unjust invader, or humanitarian intervention to stop grave abuses of human rights by a tyrannical regime." 18 Following that path, Article 51, which addresses the actions of individual states when faced with aggression, may not unequivocally restrict those same multilateral actions discussed in Article 39 -actions, military or not, to counter the existence of any threat to the peace. There is at least an opening for that possible interpretation of the UN Charter.
Before considering these three sources, let us address one last set of definitions:
preemptive and preventive.
Preemptive And Preventive
Preemptive is defined as "a. relating to or constituting a military strike made so as to gain the advantage when an enemy strike is believed to be imminent; b. any additional definition of these two words. So, these dictionary definitions will suffice.
Preemption is a type of action that is tied to imminent self-defense. It has an historical customary international law precedent. Preventive military actions do not currently have any legal precedents to fall back on for justification.
Analysis Of The Source Documents
Although there are numerous similarities between these documents, there are critical differences as well. When considering causes for just war, Grotius lists several justifications for war, including, most importantly for this discussion, immediate danger. We see that Daniel
Webster gives additional detail to the definition of immediate, including "instant" and "no moment for deliberation." Current scholars use the term "imminent" to fit these definitions, from which we derive the phrase "imminent threat." According to both Grotius and Webster, an imminent threat may be just cause for preemptive war. For many years, this was the acknowledged standard. However, the United Nations Charter does not explicitly say that an individual state has the right to preemptive self-defense. In fact, the only unilateral self-defense specifically mentioned in the Charter is self-defense against an armed attack. The Charter allows more freedom for a collective response that could include threats to the peace, clearly leaving the option for a preemptive military action available. In addition, there is a dichotomy between traditional views of imminent, which produce the aforementioned definition of preemptive war, and a potentially broader definition of imminent threat that could lead to preventive war.
This discrepancy between the historical just-war criteria, the existing international law, and the US desire to adapt the definition to include what many believe is preventive war is the focus of much debate and at the heart of this paper's concern. The United States Government NSS
indicates that the definition of imminent needs to be adapted to fit the current threat
environment.
An area of relative agreement between these documents is that of last resort as a part of proportionality. Grotius indicates that preemptive war against an imminent threat can be justified if all other reasonable attempts have failed. Webster also supports that idea when he uses the phrase "leaving no choice of means." Preemptive attack is justified in some cases, but you must have no other reasonable alternatives to that action. Finally, the United Nations Finally, Webster addresses legitimate authority when he mentions it will be "for that government to show" that preemptive attacks were justified, implying that the legitimate government, which has executed some military action, has already approved that action. The UN Charter, by its very nature as an international treaty, signed and ratified by legitimate governments, presumes that any action that is or is not taken in accordance with its stated Articles, is executed by a legitimate authority. Actions taken by an entity that was not the legitimate authority of a nation-state would not be bound to those rules, and discussion would be moot.
A final thought to consider in the just-war framework is the inter-relation between individual criteria. One example is the relationship between just cause and legitimate authority.
If country X took a preemptive action against country Y, feeling that a threat was imminent, on the surface you could argue that just cause is met. However, if country X were a member of the United Nations, some would argue that any preemptive action, without approval of the Security Council, violates the UN Charter. If you support that argument, then the just cause action taken by country X violates the legitimate authority criterion because country X has broken an international treaty.
Now that we have reviewed the historical basis for just-war theory with respect to just cause, let us examine how the administration presents that argument through written and spoken policy. Bush ushers in a completely new public strategy for the use of United States military force. He continues in that same speech by saying, "Yet the war on terror will not be won on the defensive. We must take the battle to the enemy, disrupt his plans, and confront the worst threats before they emerge. In the world we have entered, the only path to safety is the path of action." 24 To this point in the speech, President Bush has not yet used the key word, "preemptive." However, just a few moments later he states, "Our security will require transforming the military you will lead --a military that must be ready to strike at a moment's notice in any dark corner of the world. And our security will require all Americans to be forwardlooking and resolute, to be ready for preemptive [highlighted by author] action when necessary to defend our liberty and to defend our lives."
UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT POLICY ON PREEMPTION
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In just a few short minutes, President Bush quickly laid out a new military and national strategy and provided a justification for the policy as well. His next step was to make this policy an official part of our National Security Strategy. We will disrupt and destroy terrorist organizations by: defending the United States, the American people, and our interests at home and abroad by identifying and destroying the threat before it reaches our borders. While the United States will constantly strive to enlist the support of the international community, we will not hesitate to act alone, if necessary, to exercise our right of self-defense by acting preemptively against such terrorists, to prevent then from doing harm against our people and our country. Certainly they were imminent on September 10, although we didn't know it. … Anyone who believes that we can wait until we have certain knowledge that attacks are imminent has failed to connect the dots that led to September 11." 28 This explanation is the key factor in the Bush administration's argument that imminent must be expanded, and preemptive become preventive when necessary. With that adaptation, preventive war could potentially satisfy just cause.
In September 2002, President Bush published The National Security Strategy of the
President Bush also addresses the second criteria -proportionality -in the just-war framework, (and in this case the last resort element). First, he indicates that containment and deterrence practices, which were effective during the cold war, are not effective against this new threat of terrorism. It appears that he is justifying armed military preventive action as a last resort before the future events actually play out. But later, he clarifies US intent by stating, "The United States will not use force in all cases to preempt emerging threats, nor should nations use preemption as a pretext for aggression." 29 President Bush has concluded that preemptive action may be required in some circumstances as a last resort, and that US policy will not be to act preemptively in every situation. His meaning is clear -the US will continue to adhere to the basic proportionality criteria espoused in just-war theory, so that any preemptive action will be a last resort response to an imminent threat. 
EXPERT OPINIONS.
The two elements of focus for this paper are an evaluation of whether the general US National Security Strategy and the specific action in Iraq are in agreement with particular criteria of the just-war framework. The criteria of Just Cause and Proportionality have applicability in both the conceptual side of the discussion, that of the policy itself, and the execution of the policy, the US military action in Iraq. The legitimate authority criteria, however, will often not have real meaning in the abstract of policy, for we assume that the legitimate authority will authorize use of force, when we are speaking about a group of potential events in the future.
And, we assume that the legitimate authority of the state will not violate statutory or customary international law. However, for specific examples of that military force, legitimate authority is a valuable and necessary criterion to discuss. For this reason, we will examine just cause and proportionality with respect to the US policy and all three criteria with respect to the US action in
Iraq. Below, we will consider some expert opinions on these various issues.
LEGITIMATE AUTHORITY
We assume that legitimate authority will exist for an action when a policy is developed and articulated, such as the preemptive policy detailed in the National Security Strategy. However, legitimate authority must exist for each and every instance of that policy's execution. For the military intervention in Iraq, many were openly skeptical of President Bush's specified intent to take unilateral action against Iraq, without having Congressional approval of that action. Prior to any action by Congress, Joyce Appleby and Ellen Carol DuBois published an article entitled "War Issue Imperils Constitution," addressing the preemption policy using the legitimate authority criterion of the just-war framework. The authors state, "Article 1, Section 8 of the Constitution is explicit in giving Congress, not the president, the power to declare war. There's no ambiguity here concerning the original intent." 30 The authors logically identify that in an anticipated attack on Iraq, without Congressional declaration of war, the legitimate authority, by our own law, has failed to "legitimize" the war, and by extension, the preemptive attack. Later in the article the authors make the following claim: "The trauma of Sept. 11 attacks may have numbed the public to how unprecedented a preemptive attack from the United States would be.
It would violate every principle this country has stood for." 31 or it would face serious consequences. 33 From this perspective, it is possible to argue that the US led action in Iraq did have a degree of international legitimacy. Of course, others would argue that the US led effort did not have the specific approval of the UN Security Council, and so was not legitimate. From a just-war criterion of legitimate authority, the military intervention in Iraq was more likely valid than not.
PROPORTIONALITY
The most important element of this criterion is the idea of last resort. War must be the last option after all other reasonable options have been exhausted. From a policy standpoint, a view of last resort is important only from a stated intent perspective, since one can only determine if an action was a last resort after the fact, and even that can be problematic. So, from the policy perspective we have seen that the administration does promote preemptive war as a last resort and only in specific cases. The President does not argue that preemptive war is, nor should be, a common event that is authored by the United States or any other state. So, for the policy, we can say that the last resort criterion of the just-war framework is valid. In an article entitled "Redefine Cooperative Security, Not Preemption," Gu Guoliang states, "A national security strategy of preemption poses a serious challenge to the existing tenets of international law and to the framework of the UN." 38 Later, Guoliang states, "No country is entitled to deprive the UN of its right to judge whether or not a war is justified. The international community as a whole, therefore, cannot accept preemption as the national security strategy of one single nation. Otherwise, any single nation may become the judge and jury of international law." 39 Here is an example of where legitimate authority and just cause overlap. Guoliang may be arguing that the US violated legitimate authority because they had no UN Security Council approval for their action, or he may be arguing that no just cause exists because he does not agree with the President's interpretation of the UN Charter. For this discussion, we will interpret his argument to be against just cause, rather than legitimate authority. This group supports the existing international legal document, the UN Charter, in its strictest interpretation. From their position, the US policy of preemption is illegal, whether it is linked to the historical interpretation of preemption or not. In this group's opinion, the US policy fails just cause. As well, any action by the US that is based on this policy, such as our military action against Iraq, also fails just cause. Juan Alsace represents the views of the second group.
Alsace, in his article "In Search of Monsters to Destroy: American Empire in the New Millennium," addresses preemption in the context of American Imperialism. In doing so, he uses the just cause criterion of the just-war framework. Alsace notes that "preemption is not so radical a concept; at heart it is simply self-defense." 40 45 It can be very difficult to determine whether a state possesses WMD, and by the time its use is imminent, it could be extremely difficult for a state to mount an effective defense. Similarly, terrorists use tactics that may make it all but impossible to detect an action until it is well underway or even finished. As a consequence, it could be argued that it would make more sense to target known WMD facilities or known terrorist camps or training areas long in advance of an imminent attack if the goal is to preserve the state's right to effective selfdefense. 46 in the NSS that the existing customary law definitions for military action in self-defense are insufficient to address today's problems. His argument is that both preemption and prevention can be consistent with just cause, when the definition is correctly expanded to recognize current threats. While this argument neatly sidesteps the existence of current international law by declaring it incomplete, it does follow a logical path to its conclusion. The argument does not, however, address customary law, such as presented by Grotius Those who support the US policy of preemption/prevention, including the current US administration, do not contest the existing international law or customary law. But, they contend rather vigorously that the existing framework cannot adequately address the threats of terrorism and WMD. They contend that when the UN Charter was developed, these problems did not exist. The point of this discourse is that President Bush's NSS policy, which calls for an adaptation of the concept of imminent threat, must occur if our nation is to continue to protect the security and freedom we so dearly hold.
So, which argument is compelling? From a just cause perspective, the policy may violate both international law and customary international law. Those who make these arguments are correct. However, to take this view is to ignore the one most important lesson of history -those who fight the last war, lose. President Bush and his administration have advocated through the NSS, a look to the present and to the future with regards to our national security needs. The President tossed the current framework aside, preserved the parts of it that are still viable, and created a new framework that gives us options to take action when it is needed to counter threats of this century. This path is dangerous, however, without international support. It is imperative that the US continues to energetically work with our international brothers to slowly gain, if not approval, then at least acceptance, that preemptive and preventive military actions are sometimes necessary to ensure world stability. Very few laws, national or international are static. They change over time to recognize the reality of the times. President Bush's NSS policy and the US action in Iraq are correct, for now.
CONCLUSION
After examining extensive arguments on all sides of the issue, and judging arguments on both sides of the just-war framework, I believe that the US policy and the US military intervention in Iraq are both correct. However, I believe that both of these actions violate customary international just-war theory, and may violate current statutory international law in the form of the UN Charter. Nevertheless, I am convinced that despite this violation, the policy and action are correct, for the existing framework of international law is not adequate to address the complexity of today's threat. It is time for both international law and just-war theory to advance and change, as they have over time to arrive at their current structure. The nature of our world has changed sufficiently that the old way of looking at things is no longer adequate. It is necessary to change our way of thinking as well.
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